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I. Introduction 
The Credit for Increasing Research Activities, known colloquially as the R&D Tax Credit, 
has lost its way.  This conclusion is apparent in light of the undeniable divergence between the 
original fundamental aims of the Credit and its practical use today.  A liberalized framework for 
computing the Credit and the contemporary tax regime have transformed the Credit’s utility in 
such a way that it no longer fosters the very purpose it was designed to encourage.  To be sure, 
the Credit’s initial objective rested on sound policy which supplies the appropriate standard of 
reference for the analysis.  Our inquiry is focused on business entities that generate R&D Tax 
Credits in excess of income and the reasons that surplus Credits are becoming more likely.  A 
primary contention of this note is that a stockpile of R&D Credits increases the likelihood of 
exploitation and threatens the intended benefit to society. 
The Credit was first introduced under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.1  The stated 
purpose of the Credit was to foster investment in innovation because such activity was deemed 
essential to U.S. economic progress.2  At the time, there was concern that American investment 
in onshore research and development was inadequate and declining.3  Because research was 
considered essential to economic progress and competitiveness, corrective action was necessary.4  
In light of the Credit’s impetus, two evaluative measures we will employ are economic progress 
and innovation.  
 
1 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(d)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 221 (1981).  As originally 
enacted, the credit was contained in subsection 44(F).  Id.  In 1984, the sections of various tax credits in the Code 
were renumbered, and the R&D credit was reassigned to section 30.  The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 30, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).  In 1986, the R&D credit was again moved within the Code to section 41.  The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 41, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).  Section 41 is where the R&D Tax Credit is 
contained today.  26 U.S.C. § 41 (2018).  The proposed regulations with respect to the R&D credit were issued when 
the credit was originally at section 44(F), but the final credit regulations were promulgated under section 41. See 
T.D. 8251, 54 Fed. Reg. 21, 203 (May 17, 1989). 
2 See H. R REP. NO. 100–1104, 88 (1988). 
3 See S. REP. NO. 97–144, at 76–7 (1981); H. R. REP. NO. 97–201, 111 (1981). 
4 See H. R. REPT. NO. 100–1104, 88 (1988).  
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Congress concluded that a substantial tax credit for incremental research and experimental 
expenditure was needed to overcome the reluctance of many companies to initiate and expand 
research programs in light of the significant attendant costs.5  Its salutary objective was to 
stimulate innovation and encourage onshore investment in technological advancement.6  The 
Credit aimed to incentivize companies to invest in obtaining new knowledge through the 
scientific process of experimentation.7  Congress expressed a desire that the Credit not apply too 
broadly but also not so narrowly such that only major advances in science and technology were 
eligible.8  A fundamental goal of the R&D Tax Credit was to encourage research activity that 
otherwise would not otherwise be conducted, hence its “incremental” parlance.9  Examining the 
Credit’s objective supplies two additional criteria for evaluation: experimentation and 
incremental research.   
The Credit, which in essence functions as a government subsidy, was designed to ameliorate 
dwindling investment in research by providing a means for companies to offset income tax 
liability as a function of their investment in research made through qualified expenditures.10  The 
Credit then is a form of subsidy because the Federal Government is choosing to forego tax 
revenue it is otherwise entitled to collect and channel it instead as an investment to stimulate 
certain research activities.11  Thus, companies that made qualifying research expenditures 
(“QREs”) were entitled to claim a nonrefundable tax credit that could be used to offset regular 
 
5 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 120 
(1981) [hereinafter ERTA Explanation]. 
6See ERTA Explanation supra note 5, at 120. See also Prop. Reg. 1.41-1(a) (1998) (stating that the research credit 
"is intended to encourage business firms to perform the technological research necessary to increase innovative 
qualities and efficiency of the U.S. economy."). 
7 See ERTA Explanation supra note 5, at 120. 
8 David L. Cameron, Research Tax Credit: Statutory Construction, Regulatory Interpretation and Policy 
Incoherence, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 63, 69 (2004).  
9 See 135 CONG. REC. S13114, S13125 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989). 
10 See H. R. REP. NO. 97–201 at 111.   
11 Id. 
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income tax liability for the year the credits were generated.12  A sunset provision automatically 
ending the credit’s effect absent further action was included in the 1981 Act, effectively making 
the Credit a temporary provision.13  The main reason for the temporary designation was due to 
concern over the revenue cost of making the credit permanent.14   Indeed, a primary challenge is 
how to reasonably guarantee federal revenue foregone in the form of tax credits dollars is 
actually being used to perpetuate technological advancement.15  Further, the R&D Tax Credit’s 
original objective does not contemplate continuing tax relief for research that has already 
concluded or halted because Credits was required to be applied to income in the year they were 
generated.16  Considering the choice of a tax credit to achieve the stated purpose and reasons for 
its temporary nature, we then must look to revenue costs as yet another evaluative measure. 
Distributing tax credits also has a societal cost.17  The social welfare cost of the tax credit 
depends on the nature of the tax used to collect funds to pay for the Credit itself.18  Ideally, the 
value of the Credit should equal the expected value of the research to the inventor and the 
expected value of the research to society.19  Even if a given research objective does not result in 
a commercial success, innovative knowledge may still be obtained that has utility in some other 
endeavor.20  Such a positive externality is known as a “spillover effect.” 21  At some point 
 
12 Id. 
13 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 221(d)(1); S. REP. NO. 97-144 (1981); H. R. REP. NO. 97-201 (1981). 
14 Stephen E. Shay et. al., R&D Tax Incentives: Growth Panacea or Budget Trojan Horse?, 69 TAX L. REV. 419, 
434 (2016).  
15 See generally Shay supra note 14, at 442 (discussing policy justifications for subsidizing R&D). 
16 See ERTA Explanation supra note 6, at 120. 
17 Shaun P. Mahaffy, The case for Tax: A Comparative Approach to Innovation Policy, 123 YALE L. J. 812, 826 
(2013). 
18 See  Mahaffy supra note 17, at 826. 
19 See  Mahaffy supra note 17, at 826. 
20 Shay supra note 14, at 427. 
21 Evan Wamsley, The Definition of Qualified Research Under the Section 41Research and Development Tax 
Credit: Its Impact on the Credit’s Effectiveness, 87 VA. L. REV 165, 185 (2001).  
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though, the cost to society can outweigh the benefit of the subsidy for a particular endeavor.22  
Spillovers aside, the subsidy was intended to redound to the benefit of society, writ large.23  
Absent a benefit to society, the Credit’s utility is vitiated.24  Thus, the benefit to society must be 
considered as a final evaluative measure.    
The R&D Tax Credit has been assumed by some authorities to induce two dollars of 
spending for every one credit dollar realized.25  In 2013, it was estimated that businesses 
received approximately $11 billion dollars in research credits across all sectors.26  According to 
recent estimates, U.S. companies will receive more than $25 billion dollars of R&D incentives in 
2019 and 2020. 27   The majority of this figure will comprise self-reported R&D Tax Credits 
claimed on company tax returns.28  Such an expenditure by the federal government demands 
careful scrutiny. The trick is to ensure this money is being deployed in the spirit of the original 
intent.   
The R&D Tax Credit appears somewhat stable in isolation today, but contemporary tax 
policy has led to significant changes in the way it can be used. The credit was renewed fifteen 
times until it was ultimately made a permanent via the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes 
(“PATH”) Act of 2015.29  With permanency, businesses could reasonably rely on the Credit’s 
availability and incorporate its benefits into their overall tax planning strategy.  In addition to 
making the Credit permanent, the PATH Act made two key modifications to how the Credit 
 
22 See Wamsley supra note 21,at 186; Shay supra note 14, at 443 (noting a distinction between  basic research, 
applied research, and experimental development, indicating developmental R&D has a reduced societal return) 
23 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 187 (suggesting that ideally the Credit would be structured such that an entity will 
receive a sufficient payoff so that is carries out the same projects that society as a whole would choose to undertake). 
24 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 186 (noting that for the Credit to be effective, the benefits of the research must 
outweigh the costs to society). 
25 See Martin A. Sullivan, Putting the Research tax Credit to the Test, 142 TAX NOTES 1223, 1223 (2014). 
26 See Tax Stats supra note 181, at Table 1. (revealing an $11.29 Billion credit award across all business sectors in 
tax year 2013). 
27 Israel Klein, Contemptuous Tax Reporting, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2019). 
28 Id. 
29 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, § 121, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015). 
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could be utilized.30  The first modification allowed eligible small businesses (“ESBs”) to apply 
R&D Tax Credits toward their corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (“AMT”) liability.31  In 
general, AMT establishes a tax liability floor that functions to limit the extent to which 
deductions and credits can be utilized by a taxpayer in a given year.32  To determine AMT 
liability, the standard income tax is first calculated to which regular tax breaks and marginal rates 
apply.33  This result is then compared to an AMT threshold, which is typically computed at a 
lower tax rate with most deductions and credits omitted.34  The taxpayer must pay the AMT 
figure if the standard calculation results in a lower tax liability.35  Prior to the PATH Act, 
corporate taxpayers were subject to a twenty-percent AMT that could not be offset with the R&D 
Tax Credit.36  The PATH Act represented a policy paradigm shift that removed this bar for 
ESBs.37  For the first time, certain taxpayers could utilize R&D Tax Credits to offset their AMT 
burden.38  Thus, after the PATH ACT, ESBs were potentially able to generate enough credits to 
eliminate or exceed all of their tax liability for a given year.  
The second PATH Act modification to the R&D Tax Credit allowed qualified small 
businesses (“QSBs)39 to elect to claim the R&D Tax Credit as a payroll tax credit that can 
applied to offset required employer contributions to Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance 
(“OASDI”).40  The OASDI program is administered by the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) and provides benefits to qualified retired and disabled workers, their dependents, and to 
 
30 See id. 
31 Id. § 121(b).  See I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A); id. at § 38(c)(4)(B)(ii).  




36 See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, § 121(b). 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39 See I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A) (defining qualified small businesses, not to be confused with eligible small businesses 
under § 38(c)(5)(C)). ).   
40 See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub at § 121. 
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survivors of insured workers.41  Almost all employers are must make OASDI contributions for 
their employees.42  OASDI contributions represent the social security portion of every 
employer’s payroll tax liability arising out of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
(“FICA”).43  The payroll tax credit option is of particular value to a QSB that has incurred losses 
or had no income tax liability because previously the Credit could only be used to offset regular 
income tax would therefore be unusable until income was generated.44  Under this provision, the 
Credit can have immediate tax-offsetting effect for an entirely new category of taxpayer.45  
Because of the payroll tax credit election for QSBs, the Credit morphed into a pseudo-refundable 
variant because QSBs could realize a payroll tax offsetting benefit even if no income was 
generated; all other entities would be forced to carry the surplus to other tax years. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) of 2017 enhanced the dollar-for-dollar potency of the 
R&D Tax Credit by lowering the maximum corporate income tax rate form thirty-five percent to 
twenty-one percent.46  Reducing regular income tax rates plainly makes the Credit more 
powerful because each dollar has more force to eliminate preliminary tax liability.  While the 
AMT remained intact for individual taxpayers, the TCJA removed the corporate AMT entirely.47  
Where PATH Act cracked the door by allowing only ESBs to offset AMT with the R&D Tax 
Credit, the TCJA opened the floodgates by removing the corporate AMT threshold altogether.48  
The resounding impact of the TCJA is that many businesses will be able to offset much more of 
 
41 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 9 (2018) 
[hereinafter SSA Bulletin]  (providing an overview of the program’s administration and utilization). 
42 See id. 
43 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in federal Income Taxation: the Year 2015, 18 FLA. TAX. 
REV. 275, 308 (2016). 
44 I.R.C. § 41(h).  See also I.R.C. § 38(c)(1) (allowing general business credits to be claimed to the extent to which 
they exceed twenty-five percent of the corporation's regular tax liability over $25,000). 
45 See I.R.C. § 41(h).   
46 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 12001(b)(1), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 
38(c)(6)(E) (2012)) (lowering the corporate income tax rate). 
47 Id. 
48 See id.  
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their income tax liability, increasing the likelihood of a surplus.49  This note endeavors to explore 
the how increased force of the Credit creates an incentive for exploitation and has the potential to 
forestall the Credit’s very objective.  Does a large Credit stockpile is generated that may exceed 
income tax liability for decades incentive new research? 
In addition to tax reform, contemporary jurisprudence and the Treasury Regulations have 
liberalized key rules for computing QREs50 and taxpayer reporting.51  The Code sets forth a four-
part test to identify eligible research expenditures.52  The elements of this inquiry are 
summarized as the “Section 174 test,” the “technological in nature test,” the “business 
component test,” and “process of experimentation test.”53  While the Code provides initial 
guidance, classifying an activity and related expenditures as R&D in nature is a much more 
“creative” endeavor than appears at first blush.54  This is largely because the Treasury 
Regulations and case law have evinced a liberal framework.55  QREs are now understood to 
broadly include employee wages, supply expenses, and contract expenses.56  Moreover, once 
stringent contemporaneous record keeping requirements have been relaxed.57  This is largely the 
 
49 See id.  See also I.R.C. § 38(c)(1) (allowing general business credits to be claimed to the extent to which they 
exceed twenty-five percent of the corporation's regular tax liability over $25,000 
50 See Shane T. Frank, et. al., Courts Give Green Light to Claiming R&D Credit for Supplies, 84 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 260, 261 (2010). 
51 See Klein, supra note 27, at 1165.  See e.g. THOMSON REUTERS, The Impact of Union Carbide on Research Credit 
Claims, 110 J. TAX’N 271 (2009) (discussing how the court’s interpretation Qualifying Research Expenditures under 
Section 41 leads to favorable taxpayer treatment). 
52 I.R.C. § 41(d).  
53 Wamsley supra note 21, at 169. 
54 Shay supra note 14, at 426. 
55 See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-(2); id. at § 1.74-(2); Union Carbide Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. 1207 
(T.C. 2009), aff'd, 697 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the section 174 test and asserting its interpretation based 
on various sources); TG Missouri Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 T.C.M. 278 (T. C. 2009) (discussing costs related to 
process development); Trinity Industries, Inc. v. United States 691 F.Supp.2d 688 (N. D. Tex. 2010) (discussing 
costs related to product development). 
56 See William R. Swindle, Recent Cases Provide Relief for Substantiating Research Tax Credit Claims, 84 PRAC. 
TAX STRATEGIES 316, 317 (2010). 
57 Id. at 319. 
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result of generous statutory interpretation by the courts.58  The current construct has come to 
permit self-reporting and assessment of QREs that makes it possible to report tax positions that 
are subject to virtually no administrative oversight and that may not conform to the Tax Code 
and prevailing doctrinal principles.59  The liberalized rules for categorizing QREs, and relaxed 
reporting requirements all function to create a powerful incentive to artificially inflate QREs. 
This incentive is perhaps most irresistible because of the discretion afforded to the taxpayer.  
For instance, all entities that have not yet claimed the Credit may do so by filing amended returns 
for all open tax years.60  Just as with most business tax credits, the dollar-for-dollar R&D Tax 
Credit may carryover if it exceeds tax liability in a given year.61  Moreover, there is no 
mandatory requirement to deploy any tax savings to promote ongoing research.62   
While the R&D Tax Credit’s original purpose is venerable, contemporary tax policy and a 
liberalized administration threaten its integrity.  An evaluative framework considering the 
original 1981 policy aims of economic progress, innovation, experimentation, incremental 
research, minimizing revenue costs, and promoting societal benefit will be used to analyze the 
Credit’s current practical use.  Part II sets forth additional background material on the R&D Tax 
Credit and the relevant tax policy that influences its practical application.  Part III analyzes how 
evolving tax policy and liberalized interpretations encourage manipulation and have the potential 
to countermand the fundamental purpose of the R&D Tax Credit.  As a means to halt this 
 
58 See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.41; Union Carbide, 133 T.C. 278 (rejecting contemporaneous documentation requirement 
in favor of substantiation by credible oral testimony); U.S. v. McFerrin, 570 F3d 672 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing 
taxpayer to use reasonable estimates to substantiate expenditures for the R&D Tax Credit). 
59 See Klein supra note 27, at 1161. 
60 MOSS-ADAMS, LLP, Your Guide to Claiming the Federal R&D Tax Credit, 3 (2016), 
https://.mossadams.com/getmedia/Moss-Adams_RnD-WhitePaper_rev111516.pdf (noting that a longer retroactive 
application period may be possible if the company suffered certain losses and that companion state credits are also 
available).  
61 See I.R.C. § 39 (limiting the application somewhat in that the credit may be used in the carryover years only to the 
extent of the tax liability for that year attributable to the business that generated the credit). 
62 See generally I.R.C. § 41 (specifying no requirement for reinvestment).  
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undesirable result and restore the intended benefit to the American public, modest but effective 
revisions to the Treasure Regulations and the Code are offered for consideration.  Specifically, a 
taxpayer’s ability to claim the Credit for prior open tax years should be restricted and the 
Treasury Regulations need to be modified to more adequately control how businesses categorize 
and report research expenditures.  Part IV concludes with a summary. 
II. Background and Mechanics of the R&D Tax Credit 
The R&D Tax Credit has been modified since its inception in 1981.63  Supporting sections of 
the sections of Internal Revenue Code, which impact Credit’s administration, have also 
evolved.64  Additionally, the Credit’s practical operation has been shaped through jurisprudence 
and clarified in various legislative and official materials.65  Due to the complex interoperation 
between these governing materials, it is necessary to supply background information that will be 
used as a foundation for analyzing the Credit.   This section provides the backdrop against which 
our evaluative framework will be used to analyze the Credit in its current form.   
A. Evolution of the R&D Tax Credit 
Since its inception, the credit has endured multiple iterations of tax reform.  Only the most 
significant are recounted here.  From 1986 to 2006, the administrative policy of the R&D credit 
shifted from restricting eligibility to providing simplified access and generous classifications.  
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended the R&D Tax Credit for another year, reduced its rate of 
computation, and restricted eligibility.66  Specifically, the amount of the credit was reduced from 
 
63 Compare Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 221(d)(1) (setting forth the original provisions of the credit), 
with I.R.C. § 41 (containing the credit in its current form).  
64 See, e.g. I.R.C. at § 41(d) (requiring research to be eligible for treatment as expenses as described by I.R.C. at § 
174 as part of a conjunctive four-part test for eligibility).  
65 See, e.g. Union Carbide, 97 T.C.M. 1207 (discussing the section 174 test and asserting its interpretation based on 
various sources).   
66 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
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twenty-five percent of the total QREs to twenty percent.67  The reduction in rate appears to have 
been an attempt to lower tax rates and broaden the income tax base rather than in response to an 
analysis of the Credit’s prior effectiveness.68  Restricting eligibility addressed mounting concern 
that taxpayers were too liberally interpreting the Credit so as to qualify more expenses connected 
to product development than initially contemplated.69  The restriction was accomplished by 
clarifying the definition of qualified research so as to target only research undertaken to discover 
information that was technological in nature and pertaining to functional aspects of products.70  
The effect of these changes was to reduce the number of credits generated, thus minding revenue 
costs, and ensure the incremental research aim was being fostered.    
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 then made basic changes to the way the 
Credit was calculated.71   First, the notion of a “base amount” of QREs was introduced.72  The 
base amount was defined as the product of a taxpayer’s fixed-base percentage and the average 
amount of the taxpayer’s gross receipts for the four years preceding the year for which the Credit 
is being computed.73   The change was enacted to safeguard the incremental research aim.  By 
defining a base amount, Congress sought to ensure that only QREs above this fixed baseline 
would be countable when computing the Credit.  Special provisions were made for “start-up” 
companies.74  The start-up provisions addressed how to compute the fixed-base percentage for 
companies having both gross receipts and QREs for fewer than three taxable years beginning 
after December 31, 1983, and before January, 1, 1989.75  The start-up designation recognized 
 
67 Id. at § 231(c). 
68 Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffery A. Maine, Attacking Innovation, 99 B. U. L. REV. 1687, 1752 (2019).  
69 See S. Rept. 99–313, at 695-95 (1986); H. Rept. 99–426, at 117 (1986). 
70 See Tax Reform Act of 1986 at § 231(b). 
71 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–239, § 7110 (1989). 
72 Id. at § 7110(b) (amending I.R.C. § 41(c)(1)). 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at § 7110(b)(1). 
75 See id. at § 7110(c)(3)(B). 
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that some companies may not have been engaged in research for a full four years if between the 
1983 and 1989 window.  This change expanded accessibility to the Credit, fostering the 
innovation and societal benefit aims, but perhaps at the expense of revenue cost. 
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 expanded the definition of a start-up 
company.76  The revised definition included any firm so long as the first tax year with both gross 
receipts and qualified research expenditures occurred after 1983.77  Because of these changes, 
any firm first incurring QREs after 1983 can technically be a start-up.  A start-up designation 
means a streamlined method of computing the base amount and instantaneous access to the 
Credit once QREs are made.   These changes further expanded access to the Credit and made it 
easier for companies to claim its benefit.  This possibly promoted innovation and positive 
spillover effects by allowing more companies to claim the Credit, but at the expense of revenue 
due to an increased likelihood of subsidizing superficial research. 
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 introduced the Alternative Simplified Credit 
(“ASC”).78  The ASC is discussed more completely in subsection C(3) infra, but it essentially 
allows a simple percentage-based computation of the Credit over a simplified baseline.79  The 
ASC provided all taxpayers with a streamlined method to compute the Credit, but start-ups who 
lack legacy accounting records would find this method particularly useful.  This change allowed 
more companies to access and generate credits.  This may have promoted innovation but at the 
expense of revenue. It took thirty years, but the Credit has generally developed over its course of 
its renewals to tolerate expanded access—virtually any company who even remotely conducts 
research can qualify. 
 
76 See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–188, § 1204(b) (1996) (modifying Code section 
41(c)(3)(B) of the 1996 Code). 
77 See id.  
78 See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, PL 109–432, § 104(c) (2006).   
79 See id.  
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B. Contemporary Tax Policy and its Influence on the R&D Tax Credit 
Contemporary tax policy has significantly altered both the way in which the R&D Tax Credit 
can be utilized and its tax-offsetting power.  These modifications combine to increase the 
likelihood that surplus Credits will be generated and stockpiled.  The two most prominent 
revisions to the Internal Revenue Code that contributed to this result were the Protecting 
Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.  Section III 
discusses how and why a stockpile of Credits contravenes every element of our evaluative 
framework; specifically, economic progress, innovation, experimentation, incremental research, 
minimizing revenue costs, and maximizing societal benefit.  This subsection explores the 
specific features of these Acts that affect the Credit and its use. 
1. Effects of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 
The PATH Act made three key changes that significantly impacted the R&D Tax Credit.  
The first major substantive reform was to make the R&D Tax Credit permanent.80  This 
development is relevant because prior to 2015, the credit was essentially a temporary provision 
which required legislative action to extend.81  Businesses often criticized the temporary nature of 
the Credit on the ground that attendant uncertainty hindered business and tax planning 
activities.82  With permanency, however, businesses could reasonably rely on the Credit’s 
availability.  Making the Credit permeant was significant because it evidences a shift in policy in 
light of Congress’s concern over revenue costs that kept the Credit temporary for over three 
decades.83  Thus, this change potentially affects our evaluative measure of revenue costs.   
 
80 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121(a) (amending I.R.C. § 41 accordingly).  See e.g. 
McMahon supra note 43, at 308. 
81 See id.  
82 Shay supra note 14, at 434. See also Michael D. Rashkin, The Dysfunctional Research Credit Hampers 
Innovation, 131 TAX NOTES 1057, 1059-60 (June 6, 2011). 
83 Shay supra note 14, at 434. 
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The second noteworthy modification was to enable the R&D Tax Credit to offset AMT 
for eligible small businesses (“ESBs”).84  An ESB is a privately-held entity with less than $50 
million in average annual gross receipts within the prior three years.85  To be sure, the Credit 
remained available for all businesses, but the ESB category received special treatment under the 
PATH Act.  ESBs represent a large portion of the corporate landscape and associated tax 
implications are significant.86  In fact, small businesses are estimated to account for as much as 
fifty percent of all entities claiming the Credit, though not necessarily fifty percent of the Credits 
claimed.87   This is meaningful because the PATH Act enabled a significant number of ESB 
taxpayers to offset corporate AMT.88  Corporate AMT is essentially a minimum tax liability that 
an entity is responsible for.89  Generally, a taxpayer—individual or corporate—must calculate the 
regular tax using the standard schedules of marginal rates, deductions, and credits to determine 
liability and compare it with an AMT computation at a prescribed lower rate that omits most 
deductions and credits.90  If the regular tax is lower than AMT, the taxpayer must pay the 
difference.91  That incremental amount historically could not be offset with the R&D Tax 
Credit.92   
After the PATH Act, ESBs could use the Credit to offset their corporate AMT.93  As we 
will see in the next section C, liberalized rules encourage QRE’s to be artificially inflated, 
increasing the amount of credits generated.  At least for ESBs, the PATH Act furthered an 
 
84 Id. at § 121(b) (adding section 38(c)(4)(B)(ii) to the Tax Code).   
85 See I.R.C. § 38(c)(5)(C). This is not to be confused with I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A) (defining qualified small businesses 
(“QSBs”)).  
86 See Lerong He & Yuanlong He, The R&D Tax Credit: What is in it for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses?, 98 
PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 08 (2017) (quantifying the number of applicants in the small, medium, and large business 
sectors and presenting the claimed credit dollars for each). 
87 Id. at 3. Note though that in terms of claimed credit dollars, large corporations have dominated. Id.  
88 Id. (amending section 38(c)(5)(C) of the tax Code). 
89 See I.R.C. § 38(c)(5)(C). 
90 E.g. Klein supra note 27, at 1162. 
91 Id.  
92 See McMahon supra note 43, at 308. 
93 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121(a). 
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incentive to inflate expenditures because all of their income tax liability was fair game for the 
Credit to offset.  Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal 
benefit and does nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic 
progress.  Notably, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act extended same the benefit to all corporate 
taxpayers. 
A third provision of the PATH Act concerns qualified small businesses (“QSBs”).94  Like 
ESBs, QSBs represent a special class of taxpayer that received special treatment under the PATH 
Act.  Other taxpayers could still access the Credit as per usual.  A QSB is a partnership, 
corporation or person with gross receipts of less than $5 million for the current tax year and no 
gross receipts for any tax year preceding the five year tax period ending with the current tax 
year.95  For the purpose of the R&D Tax Credit, QSBs represent a subset of the ESB category.  
Under the PATH Act, QSBs can elect to claim a certain amount of the R&D Tax Credit as a 
payroll tax credit that can be used to offset the employer portion of the Old Age, Survivors and 
Disability Insurance (“OASDI”) for up to five years.96  OASDI contributions represent the social 
security portion of almost every employer’s payroll tax liability arising out of the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”).97  Virtually all employers are required to make OASDI 
contributions for their employees.98   
The ability to utilize the R&D Tax Credit toward payroll tax liability is attractive to 
QSBs for two reasons.  First, QSBs can claim and realize the benefit of a tax credit even when 
they have no income tax liability.99  Second, a QSB has discretion to use the Credit to offset 
 
94 See I.R.C. § 41(h)(3)(A). 
95 Id. (defining qualified small businesses, not to be confused with eligible small businesses under § 38(c)(5)(C)). 
96 See id.; I.R.C. § 3111(f). See e.g. McMahon supra note 43, at 308. 
97 See e.g. McMahon supra note 43, at 308. 
98 See SSA Bulletin supra note 41, at 9.  
99 See He supra note 86, at 9 (providing an example for how the payroll tax credit option works). 
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regular income tax liability if it should arise.100  The Credit was thus transformed into a pseudo-
refundable variant because QSBs have the option to realize a payroll tax offsetting benefit even 
if no income is generated; all other entities are forced to carry the surplus to other tax years.  
Under the PATH Act, QSBs were also given an incentive to artificially inflate QREs.  Any 
surplus Credits generated could be stockpiled and deployed at the QSBs sole discretion.  
Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs and offers no benefit to society.  Such a 
maneuver also does nothing to promote experimentation, innovation, or economic progress.   
2. Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
The TCJA of 2017 propagated the upside created by the PATH Act of 2015 by increasing the 
tax-offsetting power of the Credit.  With the increased potency of the Credit, it became much 
more likely that a taxpayer would encounter a surplus, meaning generated Credits exceed tax 
liability.  As section III will discuss, a stockpile of R&D Credits increases the likelihood of 
exploitation and threatens the intended benefit to society.  This section explores how the TCJA 
functioned to increase the force of the Credit.  Two modifications to the Code are largely 
responsible for this consequence.   
The first major change engendered by the TCJA was the complete removal of corporate 
AMT.101  This is significant because corporate tax payers are no longer required to compare their 
regular income tax liability—including deductions and credits—against a minimum threshold 
AMT value.102  Under the TCJA, it is impossible for a corporation to discover that it must pay a 
higher AMT than its computed regular tax liability.103  Instead, the opposite is true: Corporations 
simply have no AMT liability for the purpose of determining tax credit limitations, and the R&D 
 
100 Id.  
101 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1).   
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
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Tax Credit directly offsets regular income tax.104  Utilization of the R&D Tax credit for 
corporations is not unfettered though because other provisions of the Code still operate to limit 
application.105  For instance, corporations may only claim general business credits to the extent 
of twenty-five percent of the corporation's regular tax liability over $25,000.106  Nonetheless, 
corporations are no longer constrained by the AMT when offsetting income.  Just as the PATH 
Act did for ESBs, the TCJA perpetuated an incentive to all corporations previously subject to 
AMT to inflate expenditures because now all of their income tax liability was fair game for the 
Credit to offset.  Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal 
benefit and does nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic 
progress.  
The second critical modification by the TCJA was the overall reduction in the corporate 
income tax rate from thirty-five percent to twenty-one percent.107  It follows that the dollar-for-
dollar force of a tax credit is necessarily increased whenever marginal tax rates decrease.  Tax 
credits generally function to reduce preliminary tax liability and the R&D Tax Credit is no 
different.108  Preliminary tax liability is computed as the product of taxable income and the tax 
rate.109  Thus, when the tax rate is reduced, a Credit whose value has not decreased will have 
more tax-reducing force.  This is precisely how the TCJA works to increase the tax offsetting 
power of the R&D Tax Credit.  Due to the increased potency of the Credit, it is possible that a 
corporation can generate more Credits than its income tax liability.  This potentially compounds 
the incentive for corporations to inflate QREs due to the perceived value of a stockpile.  
 
104 See id.  
105 See I.R.C. § 38(c) (specifying limitations of the application of tax credits to tax liability). 
106 See id. at § 38(c)(1)(B).  Recall the R&D Tax Credit is still a general business credit Id. Previously, only ESBs 
enjoyed special designation under the PATH Act). Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121(a). 
107 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1) (amending Code section 11(b)). 
108 See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, Overview of the Federal Tax System as in Effect for 2019 (JCX-9-19) 
(2019) (providing an overview of the federal taxation system). 
109 Id. 
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Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal benefit and does 
nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic progress.   
Reducing the tax rate works a less obvious but equally compelling benefit for entities 
utilizing other Code sections in tandem with the R&D Tax Credit.110  For instance, amortization 
of research and experimental expenditures is an available tax deduction under Code section 
174.111  Public policy disfavors a double tax benefit and would normally preclude a tax credit 
and a tax deduction for the same qualifying expenditure.112  As workaround, the taxpayer is 
permitted to elect to take a reduced R&D Tax Credit under Code section 280 so that she may 
claim both an R&D Tax Credit and an R&D Tax Deduction.113  Here again, the Credit’s benefit 
is a function of the corporate tax rate.  Prior to the TCJA, section 280 reduced the Credit thirty-
five percent, matching the maximum corporate tax rate at the time.114  With a Code section 
280(C)(c) election, taxpayers could then only apply sixty-five percent of a the computed R&D 
Tax Credit if they also wanted to take the R&D Deduction.115   
Because the TCJA lowered the corporate income tax rate by fourteen percentage points, the 
adjusted Credit required by Code section 280(C)(c) was re-indexed to twenty-one percent.116  
Thus, under the TCJA, taxpayers making the same Code section 280(C)(c) election can now 
apply seventy-nine percent of the Credit when implementing both section 174 and 41 in 
tandem.117  The net effect is a twenty-one and one half percent increase in Credit utilization 
 
110 Yair Holtzman & Sharlene Sylvi, Insight: 2017 Tax Law Changes Increase Value of R&D Credit, BLOOMBERG 
L. NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019).  
111 See I.R.C. § 174 (specifying the requirements for amortizing research and experimental expenditures). 
112 See Id. § 280(C)(c)(1) (prohibiting a Code section 41 credit and Code section 174 deduction to operate in tandem 
unless election is made). 
113 Id. § 280(C)(c)(3) (permitting both a research expenditure credit and deduction if a reduced credit is elected). 
114 I.R.C. § 280(C)(c)(3)(B)(II) (2012) (amended 2017). 
115 Id. (subtracting the 35% reduction from the 100% gross credit amount). 
116 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1) (amending Code section 11(b) and Code section 280(C)(c) of 
the Internal Revenue Code). 
117 See I.R.C. § 280(C)(c)(3)(B)(II). 
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capacity.  The Credit is therefore more powerful when utilized to offset tax liability. This result 
also potentially compounds the incentive for corporations to inflate QREs.  Artificial inflation of 
QREs has negative externalities that offend every element of our framework.  Given the 
increased likelihood of a Credit surplus, the question becomes: At some point will a stockpile 
grow to exceed its practical value and cause a company to cease QREs altogether? 
C. Determining QREs and Computing the Amount of R&D Tax Credits 
In addition to tax reform, contemporary jurisprudence and the Treasury Regulations have 
liberalized key rules for computing the Credit, classifying QREs,118 and taxpayer reporting.119  
Certain tactical decisions within the province of the taxpayer can significantly influence the 
mount of Credit computed in a given year.120  Section III will discuss how artificial inflation of 
QREs can lead to a stockpile of R&D Credits that threatens the very aims of our evaluative 
framework.   The following subsections outline the dominant considerations and mechanisms 
that must be navigated and nuances that should be appreciated when computing and claiming the 
R&D Tax Credit.  
1. Methods to Compute the Credit 
There are two primary procedures available to compute the R&D Tax Credit: the 
Traditional (or Regular) method and the Alternative Simplified Credit (“ASC”) method.121  The 
regular computation method generally provides a tax credit equal to twenty percent of the tax 
 
118 See Frank supra note 50, at 261. 
119 See Klein, supra note 27, at 1165.  See e.g. THOMSON REUTERS, The Impact of Union Carbide on Research 
Credit Claims, 110 J. TAX’N 271 (2009) (discussing how the court’s interpretation Qualifying Research 
Expenditures under Section 41 leads to favorable taxpayer treatment). 
120 See Klein supra note 27, at 1196 (explaining various ways in which companies report qualified expenditures). 
121 See I.R.C. at § 41(a)(1) (specifying the traditional method); id. at § 41(c)(4)(A) (specifying the alternative 
simplified method).  The so-called basic research credit method also exists, but it is limited to corporations, and it 
essentially modifies the recognized base period amount.  See id. at § 41(e)(7)(E).  The details of this method are not 
discussed at length herein.  Some commentators also cite the so-called reduced credit method.  See He supra note 
86, at 1196.  This method was explained supra in subsection II(B)(2) and arises when a taxpayer makes the Code 
section 280(c)(C) election and utilizes the R&D Tax Credit and R&D Tax Deduction in tandem.  Id. 
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payer’s qualified research expenditures (QREs) over a base amount for that year.122  The base 
amount is defined as the product of the so-called fixed-base percentage and the average annual 
gross receipts of the taxpayer in the four preceding tax years.123  The taxpayer's base amount 
cannot be less than fifty percent of its QREs for the year in which the credit is assessed.124  The 
term fixed-base percentage refers to the proportion of aggregate QREs to aggregate gross 
receipts the taxpayer incurred based on historical tax years, starting after December 31, 1983 and 
ending before January 1, 1989.125  The fixed-base percentage cannot exceed sixteen percent.126  
If a company is classified as a start-up, the fixed base percentage is computed differently.127  The 
fixed base percentage for a start-up is calculated as three percent of QREs for the first five years 
where QREs manifest and then as a scaled average of QREs for successive years.128  
Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that a start-up company, as regarded by the Code, is 
a nascent business.129  Given the Credit’s framework, a company can be in business many years 
and still be considered a start-up company for the purpose of assessing its research activities.130  
As an alternate to the traditional method, the ASC provides a streamlined approach to 
computation.  The ASC value is equal to fourteen percent of the portion of QREs in excess of 
fifty percent of the average QREs for the preceding three tax years.131  If a taxpayer has no QREs 
in any of the preceding three tax years, the credit is simply computed as six percent of QREs 
 
122 Id. at § 41(a)(1)(B). 
123 Id. at § 41(c)(1). 
124 Id. at § 41(c)(2). 
125 I.R.C. § 41(c)(2). 
126 Id. at § 41(c)(3)(C).  
127 See id. at §41(c)(3)(B) (defining start-up companies as having both gross receipts and QREs beginning after Dec. 
31 1983 or any company that has fewer than three tax years between Dec. 31, 1983, and Jan. 1 1989, with both gross 
receipts and QREs). 
128 See id. at §41(c)(3)(B)(ii). 
129 Kreig D. Mitchell, The R&D Tax Credit for Start-Up Companies, 88 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 52, 53 (2012). 
130 Id.  
131 I.R.C. at § 41(c)(4)(A). 
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made in the current year.132  Electing to use the ASC method can only be revoked with IRS 
consent, and it applies to all subsequent tax years.133  While the ASC method contemplates a 
reduced credit award when compared to the traditional method, it can be the less burdensome 
option for a taxpayer if historic data is unreliable or unavailable.  Importantly, a taxpayer is 
permitted to make an ASC election for a tax year on an amended return within the timeframe for 
filing such a return.134  This option is available for all taxpayers and it can be elected even when 
claiming the Credit retroactively for open tax years.135   
2. Qualifying Research Activities and Expenditures 
Identifying and reporting eligible expenditures are perhaps the most significant factors 
affecting the amount of a claimed R&D Credit.136  Recall, U.S. companies stand to receive more 
than $25 billion dollars of R&D incentives in 2019 and 2020.137  The majority of this figure will 
comprise self-reported R&D Tax Credits claimed on company tax returns.138  An improper 
classification or apportionment of expenses, either during everyday accounting or when 
preparing either IRS Form 6765 (income tax credit) or Form 8974 (payroll tax credit), can 
severely impact the credit computation or prevent eligibility altogether.139  The procedure for 
classifying QREs is codified by statute, and the rules promulgated by the Treasury Regulations 
and interpreted further by case law.140 
 
132 Id. at §41(c)(4)(B). 
133 See id. at §41(c)(4)(C). 
134 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-9(b)(2) (2018).   
135 See id. 
136 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 191(discussing the cost implications with varying definitions of QREs). 
137 Klein supra note 27, at 1161. 
138 Id. 
139 See Siemer Milling Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 117 T.C.M. 1196 (T.C. 2019) (holding applicant failed to 
demonstrate that expenses for which it claimed research credits were qualified research expenses and denying 
credits). 
140 See e.g. I.R.C. § 41(b) (announcing the test for QREs); Treas. Reg. § 1.41-(2) (adding additional detail and 
considerations to the statutory test); Union Carbide Corp. 97 T.C.M. at 1277 (synthesizing the four-part test for 
QREs). 
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In order for expenditures to qualify for the Credit, certain statutory criteria must be met.141  
As a preliminary matter, some activities are expressly disqualified as QREs.142  Disallowed 
activities include research after commercial production, adaptation of existing business 
component, duplicating an existing business component, surveys and studies, non-sanctioned 
computer software development, foreign research, research involving social sciences, and funded 
research.143  The TCJA has amended this section such that expenditures for the development of 
any software will be expressly considered as QREs after December 31, 2021.144  This is a 
noteworthy modification as qualifying research activity connected to software is currently 
limited and has been throughout the Credit’s history.145  While historically not qualified, there is 
no reason to conclude companies are underinvesting in software in general—quite the 
contrary.146  While data is not currently available, it is likely that this change will increase 
revenue costs significantly.  
QREs are broadly defined as the sum of in-house research expenses and contract research 
expenses.147  In-house research expenses include wages paid to employees engaging in qualified 
research.148  Notably, qualifying research activity includes the direct supervision or support of 
others engaging in research.149  In-house qualifying expenditures also include amounts paid for 
supplies, characterized as any tangible property other than land or depreciable property used in 
 
141 See I.R.C. § 41(b). 
142 Id. at § 41(d)(4). 
143 See id.  
144 Id. at §174(c)(3) (as amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 13206). 
145 See Sara J. O’Connell, No Research and Development Tax Credit for Commercial Software Developers: Tax 
Accounting Software Corp. V. United States, 57 TAX LAW. 273 (2003) (providing historical context for how certain 
software research expenses became qualified). 
146 See id. 
147 I.R.C. at § 41(b)(1). 
148 Id. at § 41(b)(2). 
149 Id.  
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the conduct of qualified research.150  Finally, amounts paid to another person for the right to use 
computers while conducting research counts as a QRE, so long as the taxpayer is not 
reimbursed.151  Eligible contract research expenses are defined as sixty-five percent of any 
amount paid or incurred by the taxpayer to any person other than an employee for qualified 
research.152  A three-prong test further qualifies contract research expenses.153  This requires the 
contractor to enter into an agreement with the taxpayer prior to performing qualified research, 
the research must be conducted on behalf of the taxpayer or the “Rights test,” the taxpayer must 
bear the expense of the research even if unsuccessful or “At-Risk test.”154       
Code section 41 prescribes a four-part test that must be satisfied for research activity to 
qualify for the Credit: the Section 174 Test, the Technological Information Test, the Process of 
Experimentation Test, and the Business Component Test.155  The Section 174 test mandates that 
expenditures be eligible for treatment as expenses under Code section 174 for R&D Tax 
Deductions.156  This essentially means research or experimental expenditures incurred in 
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business representing research and development costs in 
the experimental or laboratory sense.157   
The second element requires the research to be undertaken for the purpose of discovering 
eligible information.158  Such information must be technological in nature, the application of 
which is intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved business component for 
 
150 Id.  
151 Id. 
152 Id. at § 41(b)(3). 
153 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(e)(2) (establishing a three-prong test for contract research expenses necessitating: (1) an 
agreement entered into prior to the performance of the qualified research; (2) requires the taxpayer to bear the 
expense, even if unsuccessful (the “At-Risk test”); and (3) provides that the research be performed on behalf of the 
taxpayer (the “Rights test”). 
154 See e.g. id.; Cameron supra note 8, at 147 (discussing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
155 See I.R.C. § 41(d). 
156 Id. at § 41(d)(1)(A). 
157 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1). 
158 I.R.C. § 41(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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the taxpayer.159  There is a discovery requirement which is satisfied if the research is intended to 
eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a business component.160  
Moreover, the credit is available regardless of whether the taxpayer succeeds or fails in 
achieving her objective.161   
The third element requires substantially all of the research activities to constitute indicia of a 
process of experimentation.162  Four core requirements sufficiently demonstrate satisfaction of 
the third element: (1) identifying uncertainty in the development or improvement of a business 
component; (2) implementing one or more alternatives intended to eliminate said uncertainty; (3) 
specifying a process to evaluate the alternatives; and (4) conducting an evaluative process 
through, modeling, simulation, or systematic trial and error.163  As a final point of distinction, the 
grant of a U.S. patent is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to claim the R&D Credit.164  
A patent does work an advantage though because it serves as conclusive evidence that the 
elimination of uncertainty element has been satisfied.165 
The fourth, and final, element requires the taxpayer to deliberately set out to discover 
information that will be useful in the development of a new or improved business component for 
the taxpayer.166  Research satisfies the permitted purpose sub-test if the taxpayer attempts to 
improve the function, performance, reliability, or quality of a new or improved business 
 
159 Id. at §41(d)(1)(B). 
160 Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(3)(i). 
161 Id. at §1.41-4(a)(3)(ii). 
162 I.R.C. § 41(d)(1)(C)(3). 
163 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(5). 
164 See Mahaffy supra note 17, at 825 (comparing the various costs of the patent and taxation channels to incentivize 
research). 
165 Id. 
166 I.R.C. §41(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
Page 24 of 41 
 
component.167   Thus, a process of experimentation is for a permitted purpose if it relates to a 
new or improved function, performance, reliability or quality of the business component.168 
The issue of how taxpayers claiming the R&D Tax Credit should document and account for 
qualified research activities has presented a challenge since inception.169  Prior to 2003, special 
recordkeeping requirements established high standards for substantiating expenditures.170  For 
example contemporaneous documentation meant research activities needed to be accounted for 
in real time.171  However, the burdens of contemporaneous recordkeeping have since been 
alleviated.172  Interestingly, the latest regulations do not establish any special documentation 
requirements to claim the Credit.173  Instead, taxpayers are directed to simply comply with the 
Code’s general recordkeeping requirements.174  Moreover, courts have relaxed the 
contemporaneous recordkeeping requirement by allowing reasonable estimates.175  This 
liberalization has given rise to three typical methods of accounting used to document research 
activities and associated expenditures: the project, departmental, and hybrid methods.176  While 
there are nuanced differences between the three methods, they all essentially rely on the principal 
of self-reporting.177  Self-reporting means that taxpayers are not beholden to administrative 
 
167 Id. at § 41(d)(3)(A). 
168 Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(5)(ii). 
169 See e.g. Cameron supra note 8, at 95 (discussing historic commentary on the subject and how the Treasury 
Regulations have evolved). 
170 See Swindle supra note 56, at 318 (discussing historic stringent recordkeeping requirements). 
171 See id. 
172 See Mahaffy supra note 17, at 831. 
173 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(d). 
174 See id. (pointing to Treas. Reg. 1.6001-1). 
175 See McFerrin, 570 F.3d at 679 (approving the use of reasonable taxpayer estimates for claimed R&D Tax 
Credits); Union Carbide, 97 T.C.M. at 1268 (noting substation acceptable by creditable oral testimony). 
176 Swindle supra note 56, at 318. 
177 See id. 
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oversight.178  With only the risk of ex-ante examination, the current recordkeeping construct 
creates fertile ground for abuse through over-allocation of expenditures to research activities.179  
It is clear that various tests and guiding principles endeavor to control the kinds of activities 
and expenditures that qualify under the credit; however, it is also evident that the strictures have 
been relaxed over time.  While the framework is salutary in its aim, it is largely unworkable and 
exploitable in practice.  The process of identifying expenditures is reduced to blind reliance on 
corporate records and designations of spending by the very entity that stands to benefit.  Indeed, 
it is fairly assumed that illicit conduct such as fraud is not a common enterprise; however, the 
undeniable incentive to inflate expenditures in light of the Credit’s newfound potency cannot be 
ignored.  Artificial inflation of QREs increases revenue costs while decreases societal benefit and 
does nothing to promote additional experimentation, innovation or economic progress. 
III. Liberalized Rules Threaten the Integrity of the R&D Tax Credit 
In this section our evaluative measures of promoting economic progress, fostering 
innovation, encouraging experimentation, recognizing incremental research, minding federal 
revenue cost, and maximizing societal benefit are employed to analyze how the Credit has come 
to lose its way.  While the R&D Tax Credit may appear stable in isolation, there are a number of 
ways in which its function in practice strays from its primary objective of increasing research 
activities that would not have otherwise been pursued.180  Recall that businesses receive 
approximately $11 billion dollars in research credits across all sectors in a given year.181  A 
 
178 See Klein supra note 27, at 1161. 
179 See id. (showing a significant positive correlation between R&D expenditures and contemptuous tax reporting).  
180 Sullivan, supra note 25. 
181 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Research Credit, Table 1, 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-corporation-research-credit [hereinafter Tax Stats] (revealing an $11.29 
Billion credit award across all business sectors in tax year 2013). 
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primary challenge is how to reasonably guarantee federal revenue foregone in the form of R&D 
Tax Credits is actually being used to perpetuate technological advancement.182   
As we have seen, the tax environment in which the Credit operates has changed.  The Credit 
itself has also evolved.  The rules for qualifying expenditures and computing the Credit have 
been liberalized.  It is now much more likely that entities will be able to generate Credits that 
exceed their regular income tax liability, resulting in a surplus.  A primary question to address is 
whether a stockpile promotes any of the salutary aims the Credit was designed to achieve.  We 
contend at some point a stockpile of Credits offends six evaluative measures of our framework.  
After discussing the incentives for creating a Credit stockpile and its deleterious effects, this 
section concludes with a suggested restructuring to reconcile the divergence between the R&D 
Credit’s primary aims and its present utilization.   
A. Incentive to Artificially Inflate Qualifying Research Expenditures 
There has always been an incentive to make sure no eligible research expenses are 
overlooked because the possible R&D Tax Credit is directly proportional to the aggregate 
QREs.183  The more QREs a company accumulates, the greater the amount of the computed 
R&D Tax Credit.  Indeed, at a minimum, the four-part test must be satisfied to comply with the 
statute.184  There are, however, numerous expense categories that can prove difficult to police in 
practice.185  This is particularly true with the employee wage sub-category of in-house 
 
182 See generally Shay supra note 14, at 442 (discussing policy justifications for subsidizing R&D). 
183 See I.R.C. § 41(a).  This is true regardless of the credit computation methodology selected. 
184 Id. at § 41(d). See also McFerrin, 570 F.3d at, 676 (“Qualified research” has four separate and independent 
requirements: (1) the expenses must be of the type deductible under I.R.C. § 174; (2) the research must be 
undertaken ‘for the purpose of discovering information ... which is technological in nature;’ (3) the application of 
that information must be ‘intended to be useful in the development of anew or improved business component of the 
taxpayer;’ and (4) substantially all of the research activities must ‘constitute elements of a process of 
experimentation.’). 
185 See e.g. Shay supra note 14, at 426-29 (discussing the difficulty with categorizing employee wages).  
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expenses.186  Wages are defined to mean all remuneration for services performed by an employee 
for her employer, which is a construct adopted from elsewhere in the Code.187  Applying the 
statutory four-part test then means if “substantially all” of the services rendered by an employee 
during a tax year is spent on research activities, then the entirety of that employee's wage 
becomes a QRE for the purposes of the R&D Credit.188  The Treasury Regulations announce that 
the “substantially all” threshold is satisfied for a given employee if the time devoted to qualified 
research constitutes at least eighty percent of the total time.189   
Recall that the recognized categories of employee service include direct research activity, 
direct supervision of the same, direct support, or any combination thereof.190  Under the rules 
then, the entire wage paid to a given employee who has directly engaged in, supervised, 
supported, or otherwise contributed to any research activity is considered a QRE so long as 
eighty-percent of her time was dedicated in the effort.191  Considering the self-reporting and 
relaxed recordkeeping requirements, it is not hard to imagine “creative accounting” tactics when 
assessing whether a given employee has conducted just enough direct, supervisory, or support 
activity such that the eighty percent threshold is crossed.192  Administrative feasibility is indeed 
desirable, but perhaps the salary of an employee is too significant an expense to “guestimate.” 
 
186 See id.  Compare Shami v. Comm'r, 741 F.3d 560, 564 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that the salaries of the president 
and the cochairman of the board, neither of whom had “any formal education or training in chemistry or 
engineering,” amounted to eighty percent of the research expenditures claimed even though dozens of other 
employees were claimed to have been engaged), with Suder v. Comm'r, 108 T.C.M. 354 (T.C. 2014) (“During the 
years at issue Mr. Suder served as the chief executive officer (CEO) of ESI. However, he did not perform the typical 
duties of a CEO. He spent most of his time brainstorming ideas for new products and ways to improve existing 
products.”). 
187 See I.R.C. § 41(b)(2)(D) (indicating wages are identical to the Code section 3401(a) definition). 
188 See id. at § 41(b)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(d)(2).  
189 See Treas. Reg. §1.41-2(b)(1). 
190 I.R.C. § 41(b)(2). 
191  Cameron supra note 8, at 147 (discussing wages and the interaction with the “substantially all” test). 
192 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., The Research Tax Credit's Design and Administration Can Be Improved 
(GAO-10-136),  (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter GAO Report] (noting wages to be included in costs eligible for the R&D 
Credit are a source of dispute, particularly to what constitutes direct supervision or support of research). 
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The statute does not expressly require an investment in R&D to pay off.  In fact, quantifiable 
success is not an essential element of the statutory four-part test.193  The real question is how to 
properly determine the value of research efforts that cannot be deemed a conventional success.  
For instance, there may be a time delay between when the research activity was conducted and 
when a property right, product, or other benefit with a positive return materializes.194  Research 
is inherently iterative and tentative in nature; the Code by its own terms requires uncertainty to 
be addressed via a process of experimentation.195  Even if a given research objective does not 
result in a commercial success, innovative knowledge may still be obtained that has utility in 
some other endeavor.196  Such a positive externality is referred to as a “spillover effect.”197   
Spillover notwithstanding, the R&D Credit has real costs to society and its effectiveness must 
be objectively evaluated in the context of its aim of promoting economic progress.198  Today, 
researchers need not be demonstrably efficient or effective in their efforts—pyrrhic victories are 
acceptable.199  Some amount of “failure” should be tolerated as part of the process, but at some 
point the cost to society can outweigh the benefit of the subsidy for a particular endeavor.200  The 
issue is that there is currently no mechanism to limit the duration or scope of any QRE that an 
entity may be incurring.  Thus, the credit can virtually be claimed in perpetuity for a particularly 
persistent entity for even superficial research activity.  A nefarious taxpayer may choose to 
 
193 See I.R.C. § 41(d) (not specifying a test for employee competence or qualifications); Treas. Reg. at §1.41-
4(a)(3)(ii) (allowing satisfaction of the four-part test even if experimental efforts are unsuccessful).  See also Shay 
supra note 14 at, 427-28 (discussing difficulties in qualifying and assessing the value of unsuccessful research). 
194 Shay supra note 14 at, 427.   
195 See I.R.C. § 41(d). 
196 Shay supra note 14, at 427. 
197 Wamsley supra note 21, at 185. 
198 See id. at 184.   
199 Treas. Reg. §1.41-4(a)(3)(ii) (allowing satisfaction of the four-part test even if the efforts are unsuccessful). 
200 See Wamsley supra note 21,at 186; Shay supra note 14, at 443 (noting a distinction between  basic research, 
applied research, and experimental development, indicating developmental R&D has a reduced societal return) 
Page 29 of 41 
 
tenuously maintain what amounts to a sham research program such that the attractive tax benefit 
the Credit offers can be preserved.  The Credit is ill-equipped to address such issues. 
The regulation’s “substantially all” interpretation as applied to employee wages seemingly 
offers more of an incentive for companies claim eighty percent of certain employee’s time was 
research-related than it does to promote technological advancement through innovation and 
experimentation.  It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where a business entity assigns 
gratuitous supervisory or support tasks to satisfy the statute and tip the balance over the critical 
threshold so the entire employee’s wage is a countable QRE.201  In fact, mere brainstorming 
activities have been held to satisfy the test.202  Even with the most scrupulous accounting, it does 
not seem likely that eighty-one percent of an employee’s time is tantamount to a one hundred 
percent commitment to research.  It would seem plausible that nineteen percent more dedication 
would have an equally measureable benefit.  Of course, if the eighty percent figure is arrived at 
using an overgenerous gloss the problem is exacerbated.  This is especially troubling in light of 
the fact that wages make up the majority of QREs for most taxpayers.203 
The resulting classification of salary as a QRE may redound to the benefit of offsetting an 
entity’s tax bill, but society foots the bill when legitimate research commensurate with the wage 
allocation does not occur.204  The aims of promoting innovation and economic progress are 
forestalled when a company’s research investment is merely illusory.  Unless genuine research is 
 
201 See Shami 741 F.3d at 564 (finding an over allocation of eligible wages when a company claimed that dozens of 
its employees engaged in qualified research each year, and the bulk of its wage QREs came from the salaries of only 
the CEO and Cochairman of the Board, neither had formal training in chemistry or research). 
202 See Suder v. Comm'r, 108 T.C.M. at 354 (holding CEO’s time brainstorming ideas for new products and ways to 
improve existing products was a QRE). 
203 Mitchell supra note 129, at 52. 
204 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 186 (noting societal benefits of the research activity encouraged must outweigh 
the social costs and that benefit is proportional to additional research generated).  
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conducted, no subsidy should be extended.205  Moreover, extending a subsidy for no return in 
societal benefit patently offends the aim of minimizing costs to federal revenue. 
There may also be a detrimental effect on employee upward mobility.  For instance, consider 
a deserving employee whose promotion would mean her involvement in research activity would 
fall below the almighty eighty-percent threshold.  In such a scenario, the employer may realize 
that said employee’s wage is no longer completely eligible as a QRE, thereby increasing the out-
of-pocket cost to the company.  While undocumented, an unfortunate scenario can be imagined 
whereby eligibility for an anticipated tax credit may factor into the calculus of employee 
development and career trajectory.  These problems are particularly evident in small businesses, 
such as an ESB, where employees are likely to assume multiple duties.206  Overzealous estimates 
of employee time dedicated to research and tenuous classification of research activities is 
difficult to police in a small business environment, especially when relying on the self-reporting 
construct.207    
B. The Current Tax Environment Threatens the R&D Tax Credit’s Purpose 
The PATH Act and TCJA open the door for entities to exploit the Credit at a great cost the 
very society it is intended to benefit.  Ideally, the Credits available would be assessed as the 
difference between the value of the research to the company and the value of the research to 
society.208  The value of the research to the company is expected to be realized through the 
beneficial return in the form of profit.  The contemplated benefit to society is new knowledge 
that leads to innovation and economic growth.209  The cost of the societal benefit is federal 
 
205 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 191 (noting that one risk of incentivizing research through tax credits is that is 
cannot be targeted and it can end up subsidizing research with little or no societal benefit). 
206 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 171. 
207 See generally Klein supra note 27 (noting elements contributing to contemptuous tax reporting). 
208 Mahaffy supra note 17, at 825. 
209 See Shay supra note 14, at 419. 
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revenue used to subsidize non-trivial research that would not otherwise have been conducted 
absent an incentive.210  The issue is that the PATH Act and TCJA’s provisions significantly 
altered the tax landscape but failed to rebalance costs.  Specifically, the changes made were not 
offset by revenue increases or expenditure decreases.211    
The TCJA threatens the integrity of the Credit.  Inflating QREs in a given tax year 
maximizes the potential tax break because the Credit is directly proportional to QREs.212  As 
previously discussed, the TCJA’s elimination of AMT for corporations and its reduction in the 
corporate income tax rate significantly increases the dollar-for-dollar tax offsetting power of the 
Credit.213  Since the Credit is directly applied to offset income, it becomes much more likely for 
a claimed Credit to exceed the taxpayer’s entire liability, resulting in a surplus.214  But what 
value does a stockpile actually have?  There may be an erroneously perceived value of a Credit 
stockpile.  A company may derive some form of comfort in knowing that the surplus may one 
day be used to offset unanticipated income tax liability.  But the stockpile may grow to such an 
extent that it is virtually unusable.  The increased potency of the Credit afforded by the TCJA 
and the incentive to overinflate QREs may very well lead to a surplus of this magnitude.  If an 
entity realizes that its R&D Credit dollars have no utility to offset actual tax, it may simply cease 
to invest in research.  If this occurs, the R&D Tax Credit has functioned contravene its purpose.  
It no longer creates an incentive to invest in incremental research, economic progress through 
research does not occur, innovation and its positive spill-over effects halt, and the overall benefit 
to society is no longer achieved. 
 
210 See Shay supra note 14, at 419. 
211 See Shay supra note 14, at 419. 
212 See I.R.C. at § 41(f)(1)(A); Cameron supra note 8, at 144. 
213 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1) (amending Code section 38(c)(6)(E)); Holtzman supra note 
110. 
214 See Holtzman supra note 110. 
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As the Code typically allows, to the extent that business credit dollars exceed income tax 
liability they may be carried back (i.e. applied to previous open tax years) or carried forward (i.e. 
applied to future tax liability).215  In fact, surplus Credit may be carried forward to each of next 
twenty years.216  The carry back and carry forward provisions apply to all taxpayers, including: 
corporations, partnerships, and individuals.217  The same kind of benefit is available to a taxpayer 
making the Code section 280(C)(c) election, allowing for a tandem R&D Tax Credit and Tax 
Deduction.218  As we have seen, the likelihood for surplus is increased in that context as well due 
the Credit’s tax offsetting potency afforded by the TCJA.  
Due to carryover provisions, the Credit can continue to offset tax liability even long after the 
investment in research activity was made and recovered.219  Recall the stated justification for the 
Credit was to foster investment in innovation because it was deemed essential to U.S. economic 
progress.220  The subsidy was intended to redound to the benefit of society, writ large.221  Absent 
a benefit to society, the Credit has no legitimate purpose.222  The R&D Tax Credit’s original 
objective does not contemplate continuing tax relief for research that has already concluded or 
halted.223  Due to the liberalized construction of QREs and the implications of the TCJA, a Credit 
surplus is far more likely today than it was in 1986.224  Where other operating provisions of the 
 
215 I.R.C. § 39(a).   The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat 788 (1997) (amending § 39(a)(1) 
and changing the carry back and carry forward periods from 3 and 15 years to 1 and 20 years, respectively). See also 
He supra note 86, at 19 (providing an example to illustrate options for surplus Credits). 
216 See The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 39(a). 
217 See I.R.C. § 39(a). 
218 See I.R.C. § 280(C)(c)(3)(B)(II) (reducing the Code section 41 Credit reduction by twenty one percent when 
claimed in tandem with a Code section 174 Deduction). 
219 See I.R.C. at § 39(a)(1). 
220 See H. R REP. NO. 100–1104 at 88 (1988). 
221 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 187 (suggesting that ideally the Credit would be structured such that an entity will 
receive a sufficient payoff so that is carries out the same projects that society as a whole would choose to undertake). 
222 See Wamsley supra note 21, at 186 (noting that for the Credit to be effective, the benefits of the research must 
outweigh the costs to society). 
223 See ERTA Explanation supra note 6, at 120. 
224 See Klein, supra note 27, at 1164 (the current tax regime incentivizes companies to inflate their expenditures). 
Page 33 of 41 
 
Code—such as carryovers—are incorporated, the result should be consistent with the aims of the 
evaluative framework. 
C. The R&D Tax Credit to Offset Payroll Tax Liability 
The R&D Tax Credit can function to offset payroll tax liability.225  As previously described, 
the PATH Act made it possible for certain entities to claim the R&D Tax Credit in the form of a 
payroll tax credit used to offset required employer contributions to OASDI.226  Recall, OASDI 
contributions represent the social security portion of virtually every employer’s payroll tax 
liability arising out of FICA.227  Social security is funded through payroll taxes, with half of the 
tax paid for by the employer and the other half paid for by the employee.228  Receiving the Credit 
in this form is not available to all taxpayers; the entity must be considered a QSB to be 
eligible.229  To be deemed a QSB, the entity must first operate as a partnership, corporation, or 
sole proprietorship.230  Next, gross receipts must not exceed $5 million in the current tax year.231  
Finally, there can be no gross receipts at all for any tax year immediately preceding the five-year 
period ending with the current tax year.232  A QSB more closely aligns with the colloquial 
understanding of a start-up company, although a mature company can technically qualify.   
If eligible as a QSB, the entity can elect to apply a portion or all of the R&D Tax Credit 
toward employer OASDI contributions for up to five years.233  Applying the Credit in this 
 
225 See I.R.C. § 41(h)(2). 
226 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 § 121 (amending Code section 41(h)).  See also McMahon 
supra note 21 at 308 (discussing the PATH Act’s  major implications for the Credit). 
227 McMahon supra note 43, at 308 (describing the implications of the PATH Act to the R&D Tax Credit).  
228 Tristen J. Cohen, Retirement Security: Leveraging the Research and Development Tax Credit, 15 MAR. ELDER’S 
ADVISOR 291, 292 (2014). 
229 See I.R.C. § 41(h). See also He supra note 86, at 8-9 (discussing eligibility for the payroll tax Credit). 
230 See id. at  § 41(h)(3)(A) (defining a QSB, not to be confused with an ESB under Code section § 38(c)(5)(C)) 
231 Id.  
232 Id.  
233See  id. at § 41(h)(4)(B).  The election is made by completing Section D of IRS Form 6765, Credit for Increasing 
Research Activities, and also submitting Form 8974, Qualified Small Business Payroll Tax Credit for Increasing 
Research Activities, per the instructions and statutory filing requirements depending on the business entity type. 
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manner is generally limited to the lesser of: (1) a $250,000 cap; (2) the Credit computed for the 
current year; or (3) the amount of any business credit carry forward under Code section 39 that is 
carried from the tax year when the election was made.234  Recall that if the computed R&D 
payroll Tax credit exceeds the statutory limits, surplus may be carried forward.235  Under ideal 
circumstances then, a QSB can theoretically offset $1.25 million over a five year period.236  
The Credit is available to offset employer payroll tax liability for QSBs that have no net 
income or even incur a net operating loss.237  The credit’s utility, however, does not vanish in the 
event that a QSB turns a profit.238  While the amount of credit that can be channeled to offset 
OASDI payroll tax liability is capped, nothing in the statute precludes apportioning the credit to 
both to income and payroll tax.239  QSBs can decide for themselves how to best utilize Credit 
dollars to offset OASDI payroll tax liability and income tax liability exceeding twenty-five 
percent of over $25,000.240  With the TCJA’s reduction in corporate tax rates, the Credit’s tax 
offsetting potency—making it more likely that surplus of Credits will be generated.  These 
consequences flow whether or not the Credit is used to offset payroll or income tax liability.  
Such a framework unfairly enhances the benefit to QSBs. 
The payroll tax credit election was designed to incentivize new, risk-taking firms and 
encourage private-sector decisions that prioritize investment in research and development as 
opposed to disproportionately subsidizing research activities of large established firms.241  The 
philosophy was to use the R&D Tax Credit to make labor less expensive for nascent companies 
 
234See  I.R.C. § 41(h)(2); id. at § 39.   
235 See id. § 3111(f)(3). 
236 See id. § 41(h)(4)(B). 
237 MOSS-ADAMS, LLP, supra note 60, at 3. 
238 See id. 
239 See I.R.C. § 41(h) (requiring the election to indicate the amount of tax credit to apply to payroll obligation, 
implying that the unapplied amount can be used elsewhere).  
240 See I.R.C. § 38(c). 
241 See Cohen supra note 228, at 309 (discussing the policy justification for the so-called Startup and Innovation 
Credit, which was eventually incorporated in substantially similar form by the PATH Act). 
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heavily invested in research who would otherwise be unable to access its conventional tax 
benefits because it is unlikely they would generate income early on.242  In the advent of the 
current tax regime, a QSB can choose when to begin amassing a Credit stockpile.  The QSB can 
simply elect how many Credits generated should be apportioned to offset income, payroll tax 
liability, or carried forward.243  Economic growth is primary justification for tax credits in 
general.244  As we have seen, a stockpile can exceed its utility when a company cannot use the 
Credits to offset QREs.  A start-up may then conclude that it should halt investing in research—
the very issue Congress sought to eliminate when the payroll tax credit option was installed for 
QSBs.245  If this occurs, the aims of promoting innovative and incremental research are 
threatened and progress stagnates.   
At least two scenarios involving abuse by QSB owners are possible and cannot be tolerated.  
First, a QSB owner may be able to obtain a government subsidy for a sham investment.  Self-
classification and reporting enable QSBs to liberally categorize expenses as QREs.246  
Artificially inflating QREs is not a unique problem to QSBs,247 but its effect is particularly 
egregious when considering OASDI funding is potentially at stake.  Under the “substantially all” 
rule, QREs can be significantly increased by including entire paid wages if it is estimated that 
research activities comprise at least eighty percent of the employee’s time.248  Research 
investments and efforts are not monitored, and the four-part test does not require any measurable 
 
242 Id.  
243 See I.R.C. § 41(h) (requiring the election to indicate the amount of tax credit to apply to payroll obligation, 
implying that the unapplied amount can be used elsewhere). 
244 Shay supra note 14, at 441. 
245 See Cohen supra note 228, at 309.   
246 See Klein supra note 27, at 1161 (showing a significant positive correlation between R&D expenditures and 
contemptuous tax reporting). 
247 See id. 
248 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(d)(2).  See also Union Carbide, 133 T.C. 278 (rejecting contemporaneous 
documentation requirement in favor of credible oral testimony); McFerrin, 570 F3d at 672 (allowing taxpayer to use 
reasonable estimates of expenditures). 
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objective be achieved.249  Indeed, the taxpayer largely decides which research is worth 
conducting, how to invest, and what is to be done with the results; a research plan is not 
necessary to claim the credit.250   This affords too much discretion to QSB owners.  With some 
ingenuity, a savvy QSB owner can leverage the credit to completely avoid millions in FICA 
payroll taxes obligation over five years—without ever delivering any measurable technological 
advancement to society.251  Such an outcome is likely either due to superficial research or 
artificially inflating QREs.  Meanwhile, the employee must pay her income tax with no relief.252  
In this scenario, the federal government has diverted revenue for no meaningful benefit to 
society.   
The second consequence arises out of the flexibility afforded to the QSB to decide whether to 
apply its Credit to payroll taxes, income taxes, or some combination thereof.  With the advent of 
the TCJA, Credits have much more tax-offsetting value, and tax planning can effectively 
engender a Credit stockpile that can be carried forward up to twenty years.253  Such a posture can 
facilitate a chilling and nefarious maneuver in the QSB context.   Consider, for instance, a QSB 
that employs a skilled researcher.  This researcher’s salary can be completely assignable as a 
QRE if at least eighty-percent of her time devoted to qualified research activities.254  The QSB 
may apply the claimed Credit as a payroll tax credit for up to five years and reduce out-of-pocket 
costs for its human capital investment.255  If this research then becomes profitable, resulting in 
income tax liability, the QSB may shift Credit allocation to use some or all of the Credit to offset 
 
249 See Treas. Reg. §1.41-4(a)(3)(ii). 
250 Mahaffy supra note 17, at 825. 
251 See I.R.C. § 41(h) (allowing for a possible $250,000 cap over five years of credit to be applied). 
252 See Cohen supra note 228, at 292. 
253 See Holtzman supra note 110. 
254 See I.R.C § 41(b)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(d)(2). 
255 See I.R.C. § 41(h)(2). 
Page 37 of 41 
 
its liability, and choice can be made each year.256   The TCJA operates to reduce corporate taxes 
and increase the tax-offsetting force of the credit, making carry forward of a Credit surplus more 
likely.  Because ongoing research is not required to utilize the Credit stockpile, there is no 
safeguard for the researcher’s job.  A nefarious owner driven by avarice could have the 
government subsidize a portion of his workforce for five years, reap the payroll tax benefit while 
stockpiling surplus credits, terminate R&D initiative/employee, and apply the Credit toward 
income tax into the future for twenty years.  Indeed this would require a five year development 
cycle and there is a theoretical limit to the pro rata tax benefit, but the possibility exists.  Such a 
high social welfare and tax revenue cost was not a contemplated outcome in 1981. 
D. Restructuring to Minimize Exploitation and Restore Purpose 
The current framework for claiming the R&D tax credit needs to be adjusted to realign its 
purpose in the context of the current tax regime.  The R&D Tax Credit’s own codifying section 
has remained largely unchanged in the advent of the PATH Act and TCJA.257  As we have seen, 
the interplay with other Code sections creates powerful incentives to exploit its liberalized rules 
and increases the likelihood that a Credit stockpile will be generated.  This is not to say the entire 
R&D Tax Credit has run its useful course, as others have contended.258  Recall that the R&D Tax 
Credit has been assumed by some authorities to induce two dollars of spending for every one 
credit dollar realized.259  The Credit represents over $20 billion in spending though, and such an 
expenditure demands careful scrutiny.260  A sum of this magnitude can be positively 
transformative if deployed to obtain new knowledge and promote the positive externalities 
 
256 See id. 
257 See Holtzman supra note 110.  
258 See Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 49 (2017) 
(doubting the social desirability of current practices for promoting innovation through tax incentives, and 
considering why non-tax cash-transfers are perhaps socially superior). 
259 Sullivan, supra note 25. 
260 Sullivan, supra note 25, at 1223. 
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discussed earlier.261  Two modifications are suggested to redress the Credit’s vulnerabilities.  
First, a taxpayer’s ability to look back and open prior tax years to generate the Credit needs to be 
restricted.  Second, the Regulations need to be revised to mandate more exacting control over 
qualified research expenditures (“QREs”).  Each of these remedial measures is discussed in turn.  
Taxpayers should be restricted from opening prior tax years and claiming the R&D Tax 
credit.  Currently, an entity may look back to an open tax year and claim the credit by filing an 
amended return.262  The Alternative Simplified Credit computation method may be used to 
streamline this process, minimizing the documentation requirement in favor of a percentage 
calculation of QREs.263  It is against a fundamental aim of the credit to be reimbursed for past 
research activities.  Recall that the Credit was intended to stimulate investment in development 
activities that would not otherwise have been undertaken in its absence.264  Prior investments in 
research clearly do not comport with this requirement as the research effort and expenditure 
already occurred and whatever investment made was presumably recovered.  This kind of 
research patently would have occurred without the Credit.  When the PATH Act made the Credit 
permanent the public was placed on actual notice of its existence, thereby neutralizing any 
claims of ignorance.  If the Credit is not claimed in a timely manner, the presumption should be 
the investment in research would have otherwise been made, obviating the need for the Credit’s 
tax-offsetting value; therefore, absent extenuating circumstances, a taxpayer should not be 
 
261 Cf. Shay supra note 21, at 440-42 (noting that positive externalities can lead to societal benefits such as improved 
productivity and higher wage jobs in proximity to where research is conducted thus improving social benefit; 
however, in the absence of research activities the societal cost of subsidizing seems unjustified). 
262 MOSS-ADAMS, LLP supra note 60, at 3 (noting that a longer retroactive application period may be possible if the 
company suffered certain losses and that companion state credits are also available). 
263 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-9(b)(2) (2018).   
264 See 135 CONG. REC. S13114, S13125 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989). 
Page 39 of 41 
 
entitled to retroactive relief.  Indeed, other mechanisms besides a tax subsidy can provide 
adequate incentive for innovation, such as research grants.265 
Opening prior tax years to claim the Credit is particularly egregious with the onset of the 
TCJA.  As described above, eliminating AMT and reducing corporate tax rate increases the tax-
offsetting power of the Credit.266  This is so because the preliminary tax liability is necessarily 
reduced when the tax rate is reduced, and the Credit offsets this figure dollar-for-dollar—thereby 
increasing in force.  A straightforward tax planning maneuver is to open all eligible tax years in 
an attempt to stockpile the maximum amount of Credits, and then apply them to future income 
tax.  As we have seen, a credit stockpile can threaten all six aims of our evaluative framework.  
The R&D Tax Credit should not be applied with the benefit of hindsight as part of a tax 
planning strategy.  Permitting such activity affords businesses far too much discretion and 
advantage when computing and claiming the credit.  It also provides perhaps the strongest 
incentive for over inflating QREs so the maximum Credit’s will be generated.267  For the Credit 
to be justified, societal benefits must at least balance the revenue costs.268  Inflating QREs does 
nothing to promote innovation, experimentation, or incremental research activities.  It does, 
however, expend revenue and detract from economic progress.  In this case, the expected value 
to the company far exceeds the value to society.  
 
265 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Quellette, Beyond the Patents—Prizes Debate 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) 
(providing a framework to compare tax and nontax incentives for innovation).   
266 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 12001(b)(1) (amending Code section 11(b) and Code section 280(C)(c) of 
the Internal Revenue Code).  See also Holtzman supra note 110 (explaining how the value of the Credit has 
increased for taxpayers). 
267 See Klein, supra note 27, at 1164 (recognizing the potential for significant financial benefit acts as an incentive to 
mis-categorize and inflate R&D expenditures thereby increasing the Tax Credit; finding a positive correlation 
between R&D expenditures and contemptuous tax reporting). 
268 See Shay supra note 14, at 421 (noting the basic premise for the R&D Tax Credit incentive contemplates new 
knowledge that leads to innovation and economic growth). 
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The framework for allocating QREs needs to be re-worked.  Specifically, the eighty percent 
threshold used to allocate the entirety of an employee’s wage as a QRE should be eliminated.269  
The statutory four-part test as construed by the courts remains useful for qualifying certain in-
house expenditures, but it is less suited to wages.270  Indeed, the largest component of R&D 
expenditures is employee wages and benefits.271  The eighty percent rule encourages those who 
stand to benefit most from the credit to simply “round up” in an overzealous appraisal when 
recounting the extent of employee direct, supervisory, and support functions connected to 
research.272  After all, it is easiest and most beneficial for the taxpayer to simply consider an 
employee’s entire wage as a QRE—especially when such an optimistic accounting will 
maximize the tax credit.273  The interests of administrative feasibility, compliance, and 
maximizing the aggregate QRE are all competing; however, a guestimate simply lacks the 
sophistication necessary to serve as a workable solution.   
In the current digital age, it is not an insurmountable task to account for an employee’s 
contribution accurately and honestly.  Tools prepared by major accounting and technology firms 
are readily available that can assist with apportioning employee time.274  Even if investment in an 
enterprise solution is not feasible, simple standard operating procedure can fill the void.  This 
 
269 See Treas. Reg. § 1.41-2(d)(2). 
270 See generally I.R.C. at § 41(d); McFerrin, 570 F.3d at, 676 (“Qualified research” has four separate and 
independent requirements: (1) the expenses must be of the type deductible under I.R.C. § 174; (2) the research must 
be undertaken ‘for the purpose of discovering information ... which is technological in nature;’ (3) the application of 
that information must be ‘intended to be useful in the development of anew or improved business component of the 
taxpayer;’ and (4) substantially all of the research activities must ‘constitute elements of a process of 
experimentation.’). 
271 Shay supra note 14, at 426. 
272 See I.R.C. § 41(b)(2) (permitting direct engagement, supervision, and support as a qualifying activity).  See also 
Shami 741 F.3d at 564 (finding an over allocation of eligible wages the bulk of its QREs came from the salaries of 
the CEO and Cochairman of the Board, neither had formal training in chemistry or research). 
273 See Klein, supra note 27, at 1164. 
274 See e.g. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, Research and Development Credit Services, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/specialized-tax/research-development-credit.html (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020) (“[W]e have developed a flexible, customizable technology solution designed to build upon your existing 
technologies. Our unique web-based solution utilizes Microsoft SharePoint and is designed to minimize disruption 
to your business by incorporating data from existing payroll and ERP systems). 
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can be accomplished through timesheets, payroll legers, and reports so that an individual’s time 
and wages are costed to specific projects.275  It may also be helpful to assign a standardized job 
description to a researcher, supervisor, or assistant that captures the extent to which certain 
qualifying functions are carried out.  Given the increased force each credit dollar now carries and 
the myriad options available to account for an employee’s time, it is not appropriate to simply 
assume wages are QREs under the presumption that eighty percent is tantamount to the whole.  
Here, the value of an inflated estimate to the company far exceeds the value provided to society.  
IV. Conclusion 
The R&D Tax Credit was introduced in 1981 with a noble purpose: stimulate innovation and 
economic progress by incentivizing entities to invest in obtaining new knowledge through the 
scientific process of experimentation.276  From the initial policy we have deduced evaluative 
measures of promoting economic progress, fostering innovation, encouraging experimentation, 
recognizing incremental research, minding federal revenue cost, and maximizing societal benefit.  
Contemporary tax policy and liberalized rules have reshaped the utility of the Credit.  As a result 
of the PATH Act and the TCJA, the R&D Tax Credit now has unprecedented dollar-for-dollar 
tax offsetting potency.  In this context, a taxpayer today can unfairly generate a Credit stockpile 
that has the potential to offend all six of the aims in our framework. 
While the current tax environment incentivizes exploitation at great cost to society, the 
fostering spirit of the credit remains its salvation.  Removing and amending certain features of 
the R&D Tax Credit can restore its integrity and revitalize its salutary purpose.  In sum, the R&D 
Tax Credit is a worthy feature that can have a positive influence on the U.S. economy; however, 
this can only be accomplished if the cost of the subsidy balances with its value to society. 
 
275 See Swindle supra note 56, at 322 9offering suggested analog methods to account for employee time). 
276 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 221. 
